Half-Hearted Alliance: Re-Examining The Drivers Of Russia-Iran Relations – Analysis

Tue, 01 Jul 2025 00:15:45 +0000
World

By Aleksei Zakharov and Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, exacerbated by the air strikes conducted by the United States (US) on Iranian nuclear sites, has significantly escalated tensions in the Middle East. Russia has condemned both Israel and the US for ‘violating international law and the United Nations Charter’.

However, beyond rhetoric, Russia could not do much in this conflict. Given its own involvement in the war with Ukraine, ongoing talks to normalise relations with the US, and close economic and people-to-people ties with Israel, Russia has been compelled to restrict its support for Iran to the diplomatic realm. Even on this level, Moscow’s proposal to mediate between Iran and Israel was rejected by US President Donald Trump. The Israel-Iran conflict has exposed limitations in the Moscow-Tehran strategic partnership and jeopardised Russia’s efforts to maintain regional equilibrium.

**Understanding the historical complexities of Russia-Iran ties **

The Middle East has always been a focal point in Moscow’s foreign policy, transcending its energy interests and the need to access the Western Indian Ocean. The region’s proximity to Russia, combined with its great power competition with the US, has driven Moscow to vie for regional influence. Iran and the erstwhile Soviet Union’s relations were complex, marked by instances of cooperation, yet peppered with deep distrust. This hindered Moscow from fully solidifying its ties with Tehran. Although the Soviet Union was the first major power to establish diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, its invasion of Afghanistan was perceived as an intervention in Tehran’s sphere of influence. This provoked a negative view of the USSR among the Iranian leadership and undermined the scope for cooperation.

The death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the dissolution of the USSR created an opening in the relationship. Even though Moscow was largely looking to the US in its decision-making, Russia started assisting Tehran with its civil nuclear programme. Despite US proliferation concerns, Russia entered into a contract in 1995 to build a light-water reactor for the Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP). The agreement also included training Iranian engineers and scientists at Russian nuclear research centres. That July, however, under US pressure and in a significant policy reversal, Moscow agreed to halt sales of conventional weapons to Iran.

Throughout the 2000s, Tehran blamed Russia for adopting a transactional approach, often acting according to its own convenience and at times using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the US. During the same period, Moscow did not veto additional United Nations (UN)-sponsored restrictions imposed against Iran and limited the nuclear partnership by delaying the construction of the Bushehr NPP reactors.

In the 2010s, Russia suspended the deal to supply Iran with S-300 air defence systems, following the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which was supported by all the E3+3 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US). The resolution banned Tehran from receiving any heavy conventional weapons, including missiles or missile systems.

During the Syrian civil war, Russia worked in tandem with pro-Assad forces and Iran-backed ground forces in an attempt to eliminate the Islamic State. Even though this improved the bilateral relations with Iran, the lack of trustpersisted. A vivid example was the decision to revoke the permission for Russian fighter jets to use the Hamadan airbase for conducting raids over Syria, a week after granting the access—a move forced by a wave of protests in Iranian parliament and media.

Russia has consistently upheld a non-proliferation stance on Iran, playing a crucial role in establishing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, which imposed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. Only after the JCPOA was signed did Moscow unlockthe S-300 contract with Tehran. Russia was critical of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Three years later, when Joseph Biden came to power in the US, Moscow supported an updated version of the JCPOA and expressed frustration with Iran’s obduracy.

**Russia-Iran engagement post-Ukraine **

Cooperation has gained momentum since the Ukraine conflict began in early 2022. Iran did not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine but reiterated that war was not a solution. Defence relations strengthened as Iran exported Shahed-136 and the Mohajer drones to Russia and has reportedly exported ammunition, mortars, and other military equipment.

In return, Iran has purportedly secured a deal to acquire Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. Although the contract’s details are obscure, as is the case with most Russia-Iran defence dealings, reports suggest Moscow supplied an unspecified number of jets to Tehran in late 2024. Even so, it is clear that whatever Iran obtained from Moscow did not help during the recent war with Israel, in which the latter established complete control of the Iranian airspace.

Mutual economic interests span several sectors. Russia is the largest investor in the Iranian economy. In 2022–23, investments were estimated at US$2.76 billion. Although both countries compete with each other in the oil and gas sector, Moscow has pursued several projects with Tehran, planning to invest around US$8 billion in this sphere. The two sides have promoted a proposal to supply gas to Iran via Azerbaijan, with the first phase expected to start by the end of 2025. Both countries are eager to improve connectivity through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Russia has pledged a state loan of 1.3 billion euros for constructing the Astara-Rasht railway link that could bridge the remaining gap in the Iranian section of the INSTC.

The two countries are working closely to integrate their payment systems. The Russian Mir App is already operational at Iranian point-of-sale terminals, and the full interoperability between the Mir and Shetab payment networks is anticipated soon. Although Tehran concluded a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union in 2023, its impact has been marginal, with bilateral trade hovering around US$5 billion over the past three years.